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We find an “inverse found money effect” in two-person public good experiments in which individuals
earning their endowments contribute more and engage in “altruistic conditional cooperation” when they are
matched with those whose endowment is provided by the experimenters.
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1. Introduction
The role of asset legitimacy in experimental environments is both
nuanced and context dependent. For example, Cherry et al. (2002)
demonstrate how the presence of found money (or legitimizing
assets) affects behavior in dictator games: legitimizing first-movers'
rights to assets (i.e., making first-movers' endowments earned rather
than found money) significantly increased self-interested behavior
predicted by standard models of wealth maximization. Oxoby and
Spraggon (2008) show that asset legitimacy affects not only first-
movers, but also second-movers (i.e., receivers) in dictator games:
legitimizing receivers' claim to assets resulted in dictators extending
larger offers (i.e., greater than 50%). However, in public good games
(Clark, 2002; Cherry et al., 2005) find no foundmoney effect, although
Harrison (2007) re-analyzes Clark's (2002) data and concludes that
‘house money’ significantly increases the propensity to free-ride but
not the level of contribution. Kroll et al. (2007) suggests that found
money effects are more important in the best-shot public good
environments which is more asymmetric than the standard linear
public good.
Here, we conduct a two-person public good game with hetero-
geneity in the source of participants' endowments in an effort to more
directly identify the effects of such heterogeneity on behavior. In our
experiment some participants earned their wealth to be used in the
game while others had it allocated to them by the experimenter. We
identify an “inverse found money effect” in which participants who
earned their endowments and were matched with someone who did
not were more unconditionally and conditionally cooperative. Thus, in
our environment the found money effect described in the mental
accounting literature (Thaler, 1999) and experimentally identified by,
among others, Cherry et al. (2002) is reversed. We attribute this result
to ‘anticipatory reciprocity’ as discussed by Cherry et al. (2005) and
Kroll et al. (2007).
2. Experimental design
We use a two-person public good game and the strategy method to
analyze the effect of found money and heterogeneity of endowment
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source on unconditional and conditional contributions. This provides the
simplest environment to investigate the importance of this hetero-
geneity.2 In our experiment each individual i∈{1, 2} made contri-
bution decisions ci∈[0, ωi], given her endowment ωi∈{10, 20, 30}.
Individuals were randomly paired and individuals' payoff functions were
given by3
Πi ci; cj
 
= ωi − cið Þ + 0:75 ci + cj
 
; i ≠ j: ð1Þ
Our primary treatment variable was the sources of endowments:
participants were randomly assigned to either an allocated endow-
ment or received their endowment based on their performance on a
15 minute, 12 question exam consisting of GMAT questions. Thus,
these individuals earned an endowment based on their score: $10 if
they answered between zero and five questions correctly, $20 if they
answered between six and nine questions correctly, and $30 if they
answered ten or more questions correctly. Individuals assigned to an
allocated endowment were randomly given either $10, $20, or $30.
Participants were informed of their endowment, that of the
individual with whom they were matched, and whether or not this
person had earned or been allocated their endowment. Individuals
were asked to make their contributions using the strategy vector
method (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and van Winden, 2000) in
which they chose an unconditional contribution ciU∈ [0, ωi] and a set
of conditional contributions ciC(cjU) indicating how much they would
contribute given each possible unconditional contribution of the
person with whom they were matched. In determining payoffs, one
individual in each pair was randomly chosen and her unconditional
contribution was implemented; the other individuals' appropriate
conditional contribution was implemented and payoffs were paid in
accordance with Eq. (1).
In this design there are three possible types of pairs: both individuals
were allocated endowments (Endowed groups), both individuals
earned their endowments (Earned groups), and groups in which one
individual earned her endowment and the other individual was
allocated an endowment (Mixed groups). Similarly, an individual
couldhavebeenoneof four typesbasedon the sourceof herendowment
and that of the person with whom she was matched. We denote these
types in terms of “source of own endowment/source of other's
endowment”: Endowed/Endowed, Endowed/Earned, Earned/
Endowed, or Earned/Earned. Additionally, note that there may be
wealth differences within each group which potentially affect contribu-
tion decisions (Buckley and Croson, 2006; Isaac and Walker, 1988).
3. Results
One hundred and forty subjects from the undergraduate student
body at the University of Calgary participated in the experiment, each
earning between $7.00 and $42.00 (average $18.10). The experiments
were conducted using computers and were programmed in z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).4
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. Percent aggregate
contribution (i.e., implemented unconditional contribution ciU plus
the conditional contribution cjC(ciU) as a percentage of the total wealth
of the dyad ωi+ωj) was 32.35% for the Endowed, 36.35% for the
Mixed and 40.50% for the Earned groups. These are in line with the
contribution range expected in linear public good games (Zelmer,
2003) and are not statistically different from each other using either
standard parametric or non-parametric tests (pN0.2 for all tests).
However, this lack of statistical difference at the aggregate level
masks important differences at the individual level. Unconditional
contributions range from a low of 28.83% for Endowed/Earned
participants to a high of 55.81% for Earned/Endowed participants.
We investigate these differences using OLS, the results of which are
presented in the Percent Contribution column of Table 2.5 Notice that
this regression indicates that those in the Earned/Endowed treatment
contribute a significantly higher percentage of their wealth than those
in the Endowed/Earned treatment.6
We read this as strong evidence for the anticipatory reciprocity
hypothesis put forth by Cherry et al. (2005) and Kroll et al. (2007).
When subjects who earn their endowment are matched with those
who do not, those who earned their endowment contribute more and
those who were given their endowment contribute less.
Our data also shows that, at least with two players, heterogeneity
in endowment source does not lead to lower contributions to the
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Percent aggregate contribution Percent contribution
Endowed/Endowed 32.35% 37.92%
(6.18%) (5.06%)
n=18 n=36
Endowed/Earned 36.35% 28.83%
(4.20%) (4.41%)
n=37 n=37
Earned/Endowed 36.35% 55.81%
(4.20%) (6.01%)
n=37 n=37
Earned/Earned 40.50% 46.83%
(7.75%) (5.84%)
n=15 n=30
Table 2
Regressions analysis.
Percent contribution Percent conditional contribution
Constant 0.273⁎ −0.072
0.161 0.086
Other percent contribution 0.919⁎⁎⁎
0.042
Other percent contr2 −0.420⁎⁎⁎
0.041
Endowed/Endowed 0.030 0.030
0.138 0.074
Earned/Endowed 0.332⁎⁎ 0.168⁎⁎
0.140 0.075
Earned/Earned 0.280 0.142
0.201 0.108
Wealth −0.004 −0.009
0.014 0.007
Other wealth 0.009 0.014⁎⁎⁎
0.006 0.003
Treatment⁎wealth −0.002 −0.0004
0.006 0.003
Number of obs. 140 2350
ProbNχ2 0.0050 0.0000
⁎ indicates significance at the 10% level, ⁎⁎ at the 5% level and ⁎⁎⁎ at the 1% level.
2 Other experiments using two-person public good games include Goeree et al.
(2002, who focus on increasing group size while holding MPCR constant), Harrison
and Hirshleifer (1989), and Botelho et al. (2005). Fundamentally a two-person public
good game is a prisoners' dilemma game and we refer the reader to Camerer (2003),
Sally (1995), and Ledyard (1995) for reviews.
3 We used a high efficiency factor (0.75) so that the marginal gain of all individuals
within a group contributing was consistent with that found in more standard four-
person public good experiments (0.4).
4 The instructions and treatment files are available upon request.
5 Our regression model is
cUi =ωi = α + β1 Endowed= Endowedð Þ + β2 Earned = Endowedð Þ
+ β3 Earned = Earnedð Þ + β4ωi + β5ωj + β6Treatment⁎ωi + ei:
Tobit analysis, as well as including dummy variables for the different wealth levels,
other wealth levels yield identical results.
6 In contrast to Harrison (2007) we find that endowed (both Endowed/Earned and
Endowed/Endowed) are more likely to completely free-ride than subjects who earn
their endowment. Nevertheless, excluding those who contribute zero from our
regression yields identical results.
public good, as suggested by other research (Alesina et al., 1999;
Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Poterba, 1997). The reason for this is
perhaps counterintuitive: Those who earn their endowments con-
tribute enough to the public good to offset the reduced contributions
of those whose endowment is allocated.
Turning to our data on conditional contributions cjC(ciU), for each
subject i we have a vector of length ωj detailing their conditional
contribution given each of the possible contributions of the person
with whom they are matched. We transform this into a percentage
conditional contribution given the percentage contribution of the
other subject, cCj
cUi
ωi
 
=ωj, the means of which are presented in Fig. 1.
Our data shows that those earning their wealth are “altruistic
conditional cooperators” in that they always chose to contribute a
greater percentage than that of their partner when that individual was
allocated her wealth. On the other hand, when participants with an
allocated level of wealth were paired with participants who earned
their wealth, they chose conditional contributions below that of the
person with whom they were paired.
The Percent Conditional Contribution column of Table 2 suggests
that the differences observed in Fig. 1 are statistically significant, using
a linear regression allowing for individual random effects.7 The
regression suggests that Earned/Endowed subjects contribute sig-
nificantly more than Endowed/Earned subjects.8
Fig. 1 suggests that those earning their wealth are more
conditionally cooperative than those whose wealth was allocated.
Earned/Endowed subjects choose to contribute a greater percentage
than their partner up to 60%, Earned/Earned subjects contribute more
up to 50%, Endowed/Endowed only contribute more than their
partner when the other's contributions are below 20% of their wealth
and Endowed/Earned contribute less for all levels of their partners
contribution on average. Thus, those who earned their endowment,
and are matched with someone who does not, are more conditionally
cooperative than those who were allocated their endowment. This
result is also consistent with the idea of “anticipatory reciprocity”
(Cherry et al., 2005; Kroll et al., 2007) if earners expect non-earners
will contribute.
4. Conclusions
We report the results fromone-shot, two-player public good games
where individuals were either endowed (from the experimenter) or
earned (via a short exam) their wealth and then made unconditional
and conditional contributions. Strikingly, we find a reversal of the
effect suggested by themental accounting literature (Thaler,1999) and
supported experimentally in dictator games by authors such as Cherry
et al. (2002) regarding found money effects: We find that individuals
who earned their wealth and were matched with someone who was
endowed with their wealth contributed significantly more than those
who were endowed with their wealth and who were matched with
someonewho earned their wealth. Moreover, we find that not only are
the unconditional contributions higher among earners matched with
those who are endowed but their conditional contributions are
significantly higher as well. This inverse found money effect is
consistent with the anticipatory reciprocity effect discussed in Cherry
et al. (2005) and Kroll et al. (2007). Subjects who earn their
endowment seemed to expect those who were endowed with it to
contribute more and as a result they contribute more themselves.
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